Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post-Kimbrough World by Cassidy, Michael B.
The University of Akron
IdeaExchange@UAkron
Akron Law Review Akron Law Journals
June 2015
Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post-
Kimbrough World
Michael B. Cassidy
Please take a moment to share how this work helps you through this survey. Your feedback will be
important as we plan further development of our repository.
Follow this and additional works at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Privacy Law Commons, and the Supreme Court of the
United States Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Akron Law Journals at IdeaExchange@UAkron, the
institutional repository of The University of Akron in Akron, Ohio, USA. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Akron Law Review by an authorized administrator of IdeaExchange@UAkron. For more information, please
contact mjon@uakron.edu, uapress@uakron.edu.
Recommended Citation
Cassidy, Michael B. (2009) "Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post-Kimbrough World," Akron Law
Review: Vol. 42 : Iss. 1 , Article 3.
Available at: http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss1/3
08-CASSIDY.DOC 2/11/2009 12:57:45 PM 
 
 
105 
 
EXAMINING CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING IN A  
POST-KIMBROUGH WORLD 
Michael B. Cassidy1 
 I.  Introduction .......................................................................106 
 II.  The Emergence of Crack Cocaine .....................................107 
 III.  Modern Federal Sentencing: A Brief History....................109 
A. The Sentencing Reform Act .........................................109 
B. The Sentencing Guidelines ...........................................112 
C. The Sentencing Commission Attempts Reform ...........113 
 IV.  The Supreme Court Redefines its Sixth Amendment 
Jurisprudence .....................................................................116 
A. Apprendi v. New Jersey................................................116 
B. Blakely v. Washington..................................................118 
 V.  The Court Takes on the Guidelines: Booker, Kimbrough 
and Gall .............................................................................119 
A. United States v. Booker ................................................120 
B. Kimbrough v. United States..........................................123 
C. Gall v. United States .....................................................126 
 VI.   Kimbrough: The Aftermath ...............................................128 
A. Crack Cocaine Sentencing Post-Booker .......................128 
B. Kimbrough’s and Gall’s Effect on Crack Cocaine 
Sentencing...................................................................130 
C. Congress: It’s Time.......................................................132 
 
 1. Michael B. Cassidy is Assistant Counsel at the New York State Governor’s Office of 
Regulatory Reform and also works on criminal appeals for the New York State Appellate Division, 
Third Department, as assigned appellate counsel.  The author would like to thank Wayne Cassidy 
for his thoughtful comments and suggestions and Jamie Laubisch for her endless support.  The 
opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not represent the views or opinions of the 
Governor’s Office of Regulatory Reform. 
1
Cassidy: Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post-Kimbrough World
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
08-CASSIDY.DOC 1/29/2009  3:29:23 PM 
106 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:105 
I. INTRODUCTION 
For more than two decades, the federal government has prosecuted 
crack cocaine offenders under a punishment scheme that has created 
more controversy and spawned more criticism than any other issue in the 
realm of federal sentencing.  Crack cocaine use skyrocketed in the 
United States during the 1980s.2  Drug overdoses and crack-related 
violence consumed the media, and public outcry put immense pressure 
on lawmakers to find a solution.3  In 1986, Congress drastically changed 
the drug sentencing landscape when it enacted mandatory minimum 
laws for crack cocaine offenders.4  This draconian system of punishment 
imposes a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence for offenders possessing 
either 5 grams of crack cocaine or 500 grams of powder cocaine.5  A 10-
year mandatory minimum sentence is triggered for offenders possessing 
50 grams of crack cocaine or 5,000 grams of powder cocaine.6  In 1987, 
the United States Sentencing Commission (“Sentencing Commission” or 
“Commission”) incorporated this 100-to-1 ratio in its Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines for all cocaine amounts falling outside the mandatory 
minimums.7  This sentencing disparity has left judges and sentencing 
scholars wondering why two forms of the same drug are treated in such 
disproportionate ways.8 
Beginning in 2000, the United States Supreme Court began 
redefining its Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  In Apprendi v. New 
Jersey and Blakely v. Washington, the Court held that any fact that 
increases a defendant’s sentence must be proven to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt.9  The Commission’s Guidelines were not discussed at 
length in either decision, and questions remained about whether the 
Guidelines’ mandatory nature would endure.  In 2005, the Court decided 
 
 2. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 4. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified as 
amended at 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (2006)). 
 5. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)-(iii) (2006). 
 6. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2006). 
 7. See infra note 51. 
 8. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 451 F. Supp. 2d 553, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]here is 
no rational basis in terms of pharmacological differences, public opinion, or related violence to 
distinguish crack cocaine from powder cocaine at a ratio of one being one hundred times worse than 
the other.”); Steven L. Chanenson & Douglas A. Berman, Federal Cocaine Sentencing in 
Transition, 19 FED. SENT’G REP. 291, 294 (2007) (noting that “[f]ederal cocaine sentencing policy 
has been so out of balance for so long”). 
 9. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 489 (2000); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 
304 (2004). 
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United States v. Booker and held the once-mandatory Guidelines are 
now “effectively advisory” since the Guidelines required a judge to 
impose a sentence within a specific range.10 
After Booker, several district court judges began deviating from the 
advisory Guidelines range when imposing sentences in crack cocaine 
cases.11  The appellate courts frequently overturned these decisions, 
finding a departure from the 100-to-1 ratio was “unreasonable.”12  Two 
years after Booker, in Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme Court 
held district court judges could impose a different ratio based on policy 
disagreements with the crack/powder disparity.13 
This article examines Kimbrough’s effect on crack cocaine 
sentencing.  Part I discusses the rise of crack cocaine use in the United 
States during the 1980s.  Part II provides a short history on modern 
federal sentencing, including the Sentencing Reform Act, the 
Commission’s Guidelines, and its reports to Congress concerning the 
100-to-1 ratio.  Part III examines the Supreme Court’s recent Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence through its seminal cases, Apprendi and 
Blakely.  In Part IV, this article analyzes the Court’s Booker holding as 
well as Kimbrough and Gall v. United States,14 two cases that clarified 
Booker and its application to crack cocaine cases.  Finally, Part V 
compares the lower courts’ roles after Booker and Kimbrough, suggests 
that Kimbrough may not be the answer to the crack/powder disparity, 
and explains why Congress may and should revisit the crack punishment 
scheme. 
II. THE EMERGENCE OF CRACK COCAINE 
Drug use in America began to rise in the late 1960s, when the 
social stigmatization previously associated with recreational drug use 
began to decrease and young, white, middle class Americans made drug 
use representative of protest and social rebellion.15  In 1971, drug abuse 
among soldiers in Vietnam became national news when Congressmen 
Robert Steele and Morgan Murphy released a controversial report on the 
rise in heroin use among service members.16  Drug abuse quickly 
 
 10. 543 U.S. 220, 234 (2005). 
 11. See infra notes 206-206 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 210-212 and accompanying text. 
 13. 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 (2007). 
 14. 128 S. Ct. 586 (2007). 
 15. PBS Frontline, Drug Wars: Thirty Years of America’s Drug War, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/drugs/cron/ (last visited June 1, 2008). 
 16. Id. 
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became a major political issue, and in June of 1971 President Nixon 
declared it “public enemy number one.”17  Before his resignation in 
1974, Nixon formed the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) and 
charged the group with policing the nation’s drug problems.18  The DEA, 
however, even with the assistance of the Coast Guard and U.S. Customs, 
had little success in controlling illicit drug activities, and drug shipments 
managed to slip through the borders and make their way to urban 
America.19  Federal policymakers responded with increased funding for 
law enforcement, asset forfeiture legislation, extradition agreements, and 
foreign policy initiatives to prevent drug shipments from entering the 
United States.20  When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, he promised 
a “planned, concerted campaign” against all drugs, “hard, soft or 
otherwise.”21 
Crack cocaine did not emerge until the early 1970s.22  By the mid- 
1980s, however, its use had drastically increased.  Crack was cheaper to 
manufacture than powder cocaine, and users could buy the drug one hit 
at a time.23  While New York and Los Angeles were the first cities to see 
a rise in crack use, the drug quickly made its way into cities in the center 
of the country.24  The significant expansion of the market led to 
competition over crack distribution networks.25  Crack’s low cost made 
it more marketable in poorer, inner-city neighborhoods where violence 
was much more prevelant than in the affluent communities where 
powder was being sold.26  Street sellers began arming themselves with 
handguns for self-protection against robberies from rival sellers, and 
violence erupted.27  Crack abuse and its related violence seemed to 
culminate overnight, and the issue quickly consumed the media. 
 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. James A. Inciardi, The Irrational Politics of American Drug Policy:  Implications For 
Criminal Law and the Management of Drug-Involved Offenders, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 273, 274 
(2003). 
 20. Id. at 275. 
 21. Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of Surplus Criminality: Or Why the ‘War on 
Drugs’ Was a ‘War on Blacks’, 6 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 381, 387 (2002). 
 22. See James A. Inciardi, Beyond Cocaine: Basuco, Crack, and Other Coca Products, 14 
CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 461, 468 (1987) (finding history suggests crack appeared in the early 
1970s). 
 23. Alfred Blumstein, The Notorious 100:1 Crack: Powder Disparity--The Data Tell Us that 
It Is Time to Restore the Balance, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 87, 90 (2003). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 42 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 3
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol42/iss1/3
08-CASSIDY.DOC 1/29/2009  3:29:23 PM 
2009] EXAMINING CRACK COCAINE SENTENCING IN A POST-KIMBROUGH WORLD 109 
In 1984, the Washington Post reported crack addicts in Los Angeles 
were using their welfare checks to get high,28 and television networks 
broadcasted seventy-four drug-related news segments—more than half 
focusing on crack—during the summer of 1986.29  Newsweek called 
crack the most significant story since Vietnam and Watergate,30 and 
Time labeled it the “issue of the year” in 1986.31  The extensive coverage 
was justified, with cocaine-related deaths rising from 185 in 1981 to 580 
in 1984.32  Statistics from 700 hospital emergency rooms revealed that 
roughly 10,000 patients were admitted in 1985 for cocaine-related health 
problems, a near threefold increase from the 3,300 admitted in 1981.33  
During the 1980s, the federal anti-drug budget amassed close to $13 
billion a year, approximately twice the budget of the Environmental 
Protection Agency.34  Increased spending, however, was not enough.  
The war on crack raged on, and Congress desperately sought a solution. 
III. MODERN FEDERAL SENTENCING: A BRIEF HISTORY 
A. The Sentencing Reform Act 
From the late nineteenth century and throughout most of the 
twentieth century, federal judges were afforded broad discretion when 
imposing sentences.35  Judges were free to sentence a defendant up to a 
legislatively imposed statutory maximum based on their reading of the 
facts.36  Appellate review was only triggered when a sentence exceeded 
the statutory maximum or was based on overt discrimination.37  This 
 
 28. Jay Matthews, Drug Abuse Takes New Form; Rock Cocaine Is Peddled To the Poor In 
Los Angeles, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1984, at A15. 
 29. See CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA:  POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF 
CRISIS 56 (1999). 
 30. Id. at 56-57. 
 31. Carol A. Brook, Mukasey Puts Latest Crack in Truth on Drugs, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 7, 2008, 
available at http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/legislation/Legislation008?Opendocument. 
 32. Joel Brinkley, U.S. Says Cocaine Related Deaths are Rising, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1986, 
at A1. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Dan Baum, Tunnel Vision: The War on Drugs, 12 Years Later, 79 A.B.A. J. 70, 70 
(1993).  Almost two-thirds of the federal drug budget was used for more law enforcement 
personnel, prosecutors, and prisons, while about one-third was designated for treatment.  Id. 
 35. Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377, 391-92 
(2005). 
 36. Id. at 392. 
 37. See, e.g., Michael Goldsmith, Reconsidering the Constitutionality of Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines After Blakely: A Former Commissioner’s Perspective, 2004 BYU L. REV. 935, 939 
(“Prior to 1984, federal judges enjoyed wide discretion in sentencing offenders.  A judge could 
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practice produced disparate sentences for similar crimes and resulted in a 
“Wild West” system of sentencing.38  Consequently, sentencing 
reformers began calling for a more just system, one that would yield 
consistency and fairness.39  Congress responded by passing the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”),40 and completely overhauled 
the prevailing sentencing rubric.41  The SRA provided, among other 
provisions, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which instructed federal district judges 
to consider a variety of factors when imposing a sentence: 
(a) Factors to be considered in imposing a sentence—The court 
shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to 
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection.  
The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall 
consider— 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the 
law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for— 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable 
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines— 
(5) any pertinent policy statement [issued by the Sentencing 
Commission] 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar 
conduct; and 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.42 
 
impose any punishment within the statutory maximum and still stand virtually immune from 
appellate review.”). 
 38. See Chanenson, supra note 35, at 392. 
 39. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1972). 
 40. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. 
 41. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING 3-10 
(2004),  http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15year.htm. 
 42. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2003). 
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The SRA also created the Sentencing Commission and gave it the 
authority to promulgate Sentencing Guidelines.43 
Before the Commission could promulgate its Guidelines, however, 
Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 (“Act”).44  Feeling 
pressure from the public to address the nation’s growing drug problem, 
Congress passed the Act in haste.45  The Act was intended to target 
“serious” and “major” drug traffickers, and all but eighteen lawmakers 
voted in favor of the legislation.46  For the purposes of this article, the 
key feature in the Act was a sentencing structure that would later be 
deemed the federal sentencing world’s most controversial punishment 
scheme—mandatory minimum sentences.47  The Act contained the 
infamous “100-to-1” ratio, making the mandatory minimum punishment 
for offenses involving one gram of crack cocaine the same as offenses 
involving one hundred grams of powder cocaine.48  This sentencing 
scheme prohibits judicial discretion in sentencing below the minimum 
set, unless the defendant aids the government by providing substantial 
assistance in the investigation or assistance in the prosecution of another 
person.49  The Commission had to consider the mandatory minimum 
sentencing scheme when it promulgated its Sentencing Guidelines in 
1987.  Whether the Commission at that time was “fledgling and then-
politically weak”50 or simply concerned with appeasing Congress, it 
 
 43. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987. 
 44. Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986) (codified in part as amended in 21 U.S.C. § 
841 et seq. (2000)). 
 45. See Chanenson & Berman, supra note 8, at 291. 
 46. See PARENTI, supra note 29, at 57. 
 47. See Chanenson & Berman, supra note 8, at 291.  See also FAMILIES AGAINST 
MANDATORY MINIMUMS, HISTORY OF MANDATORY SENTENCES (2005), http://www.famm. 
org/Repository/Files/Updated short HISTORY.pdf.  Mandatory sentences for drug offenses were 
first adopted by the federal government in 1951 as part of the Boggs Act.  Id.  The Boggs Act was 
later repealed by the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and Control Act of 1970.  Id.  Both New York and 
Michigan also enacted mandatory sentences for drug offenses, in 1973 and 1978 respectively.  Id.  
In 2002, Michigan repealed its mandatory minimum laws and released over 1,200 prisoners.  Id.  
Despite amendments made in 2004 to New York’s Rockefeller Drug Laws, the state sentencing 
scheme is still often criticized.  See, e.g., Scott H. Greenfield, Rockefeller Drug Laws Turn 35 (May 
9, 2008), http://blog.simplejustice.us/2008/05/09/rockefeller-drug-laws-turn-35.aspx. 
 48. Specifically, the mandatory minimums set by the Act are 5 grams of crack or 500 grams 
of powder are punishable by a 5-year mandatory minimum sentence.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii)-
(iii) (2006).  In addition, 50 grams of crack or 5,000 grams of powder are punishable by a 10-year 
mandatory minimum sentence.  21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) (2006). 
 49. “Upon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence 
below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant’s substantial 
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000). 
 50. See Chanenson & Berman, supra note 8, at 291. 
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decided to integrate Congress’ mandatory minimum punishment scheme 
into its Guidelines.51  The Commission, in fact, went one step further and 
incorporated the 100-to-1 ratio into the Guidelines for all crack and 
powder offenses.52 
B. The Sentencing Guidelines 
The Commission’s Guidelines took a mechanistic form, using a 
formulaic procedure to calculate an offender’s sentence.53  The 
Commission also developed the Guidelines Manual (“Manual”) to be 
used in conjunction with the Guidelines.54  The Manual includes a 
Sentencing Table used to determine the Guidelines sentencing range 
(GSR).55  The GSR sets the upper and lower limits of an offender’s 
sentence and is ascertained mechanically after a judge considers the 
offense for which the defendant was convicted and the defendant’s prior 
criminal history.56  More specifically, once the judge determines the 
defendant’s total “Offense Level,” found on the Sentencing Table’s 
vertical axis, and the defendant’s “Criminal History Category,” found on 
the horizontal axis, the defendant’s GSR is located in the intersecting 
box on the Sentencing Table.57 
While the Commission’s Guidelines did not completely remove 
judicial fact-finding from the equation,58 federal sentencing became 
Guideline-driven, and judges methodically imposed sentences within the 
Guidelines range.  Departure from the sentencing range was limited,59 
and courts began viewing the Guidelines more like compulsory rules.  
 
 51. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2005); United States v. 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 478 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Sentencing Guidelines extend 
this [100-to-1] ratio to penalty levels above the mandatory minimums:  For any given quantity of 
crack, the guideline range is the same as if the offense had involved 100 times that amount in 
powder cocaine.”). 
 52. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2005). 
 53. Jackie Gardina, Compromising Liberty: A Structural Critique of the Sentencing 
Guidelines, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 345, 357 (2005) (stating that “[t]he mechanical nature of the 
guidelines is hard to ignore”). 
 54. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2007). 
 55. Id. at ch. 5, pt. A. 
 56. See generally id. at ch. 5 (discussing how to determine a sentence). 
 57. Id. 
 58. For example, the precise quantity of drugs trafficked by the defendant—regardless of 
what was alleged by the government in the indictment and proved at trial—was a question for 
judges to determine by a preponderance of the evidence.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2007). 
 59. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2007) (listing the “Grounds 
for Departure”). 
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When faced with a Guidelines challenge, courts found a safe haven in § 
3553(b)(1), which provided that the sentencing court “shall impose a 
sentence of the kind and within the [Guidelines] range,” and led many to 
believe the Guidelines were de facto mandatory.60  Moreover, courts 
followed the mandatory minimum scheme, for the most part, without 
questioning the rationale behind treating offenses for “two forms of the 
same drug, containing the same active ingredient” in such 
disproportionate ways.61 
Defendants sentenced under the 100-to-1 ratio scheme challenged 
the provisions of the Act and the Guidelines on constitutional grounds, 
but failed miserably.  These failures were highlighted in the 
Commission’s 1995 report that stated, “all federal circuit courts 
addressing the constitutionality of crack cocaine penalties have upheld 
the current federal cocaine sentencing scheme, including the 100-to-1 
ratio.”62  When faced with such a challenge, the Seventh Circuit in 
United States v. Lawrence stated: “Congress in its wisdom has chosen to 
combat the devastating effects of crack cocaine on our society, and we 
believe the disproportionate sentencing scheme that treats one gram of 
cocaine base the same as 100 grams of cocaine is rationally related to 
this purpose.”63  The Eighth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in 
United States v. Buckner, where the defendant unsuccessfully argued 
that the Guidelines’ disproportionate treatment of crack and powder 
cocaine violates the Fifth and Eighth Amendments.64  Rebuffing the 
challenge, the court held “the ‘100 to 1 ratio’ of cocaine to cocaine base 
in the Sentencing Guidelines is rationally related to Congress’s objective 
of protecting the public welfare.”65 
C. The Sentencing Commission Attempts Reform 
It took until the mid-1990s to realize the effect the mandatory 
minimums had on society, and opposition became more and more 
prevalent.  Judges and academics began speaking out against the 
sentencing scheme,66 and the Commission began an in-depth 
 
 60. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (West 2003). 
 61. See Chanenson & Berman, supra note 8, at 292. 
 62. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE 
AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY at ch. 5, p. 118 (1995) [hereinafter USSC 1995 REPORT]. 
 63. 951 F.2d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 1991). 
 64. 894 F.2d 975, 976 (8th Cir. 1990). 
 65. Id. at 980. 
 66. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1995) (Calabresi, J., concurring) (noting 
that “[t]he unfavorable and disproportionate impact that the 100-to-1 crack/cocaine sentencing ratio 
9
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examination of the practice.  On three separate occasions—in 1995, 
1997 and 2002—the Commission issued a report asserting the following: 
1) the 100-to-1 ratio was disproportionate to the harms associated with 
the two drugs; 2) courts could address the harms associated with crack 
through specific non-drug-related enhancements; and 3) crack penalties 
fell disproportionately on lower-level participants, most often African- 
Americans.67 
In 1995 the Commission issued its first report, drafted in response 
to a congressional directive to study the cocaine sentencing policy.68  
Shortly after the report was released, the Commission promulgated 
revised Guidelines and recommended complete equalization of crack 
and powder sentencing by reducing the quantity levels for crack.69  The 
report detailed how each drug is made and the physiological effects of 
both crack and powder cocaine.70  The Commission found that crack 
 
has on members of minority groups is deeply troubling”); United States v. Patillo, 817 F.Supp. 839, 
843-44 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (finding it “hard to imagine that . . . a convicted rapist with a long and 
unsavory history of prior misconduct can be sentenced . . . [to] less than three years” while a first 
time crack offender with no criminal history could be sentenced to a mandatory minimum of ten 
years); United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J., concurring) (stating 
that “Congress had no hard evidence . . . to support the contention that crack is 100 times more 
potent or dangerous than powder cocaine”).  See Blumstein, supra note 23, at 87 (arguing that the 
100-to-1 ratio is “particularly distressing because crack defendants are primarily black and powder 
defendants are primarily white and Hispanic, so the differential treatment can too easily be seen as a 
manifestation of racial discrimination”).  See also David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race and Equal 
Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1319 (1995) (“It does not appear the government could provide 
a racially neutral explanation for treating fifty grams of crack the same as five kilograms of 
cocaine.”); William J. Spade, Jr., Beyond the 100:1 Ratio:  Towards A Rational Cocaine Sentencing 
Policy, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1233, 1275 (1996) (“Congress gave no consideration to what ratio would 
properly account for the characteristics that make crack more dangerous than powder.  Indeed, all 
available evidence indicates that the 100:1 ratio was chosen randomly.”). 
 67. See USSC 1995 REPORT, supra note 62, at 195-200; UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 2 
(1997) [hereinafter USSC 1997 REPORT]; UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS:  COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY at v-viii (2002) [hereinafter USSC 2002 
REPORT]. 
 68. See USSC 1995 REPORT, supra note 62, at v (executive summary). 
 69. See Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 
25074, 25075-76 (proposed May 10, 1995) (Commission's proposed Guidelines amendments).  The 
Commission stated: 
This amendment equalizes sentences for offenses involving similar amounts of crack 
cocaine and powder cocaine at the level currently provided for powder cocaine.  It also 
increases punishment for all drug offenses that involve firearms or other dangerous 
weapons, and authorizes an upward departure for bodily injury . . . . The Commission is 
recommending separately that Congress eliminate the differential treatment of crack and 
powder cocaine in the mandatory minimum penalties found in current statutes. 
Id. at 25076. 
 70. USSC 1995 REPORT, supra note 62, at vi-vii. 
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cocaine was easier to manufacture than powder cocaine and found that 
its “low cost-per-dose” made it more marketable to lower income 
people.71  Also, crack users were younger than powder users and more 
likely to possess a weapon.72  The Commission also concluded that 38% 
of crack users were African-American, compared to only 15% of powder 
cocaine users.73  “[F]airer sentencing,” the Commission stated, could be 
achieved by applying “guideline enhancements that are targeted to the 
particular harms that are associated with some, but not all, crack cocaine 
offenses.”74  Congress dismissed the Commission’s recommendations 
and went so far as to state that changes to the mandatory minimum 
scheme should reflect greater punishment for crack trafficking, not 
less.75 
The Commission’s second attempt to revise the 100-to-1 ratio came 
in 1997,76 and the response from Congress was much the same.  In its 
follow-up report, the Commission advised Congress, “although research 
and public policy may support somewhat higher penalties for crack than 
powder cocaine, a 100-to-1 ratio cannot be justified.”77  The 
Commission recommended a crack to powder ratio of 5-to-1, after 
Congress dismissed the Commission’s 1995 proposal of complete 
equalization.78  Congress essentially ignored this recommendation.79  
Finally, in 2002, the Commission issued its third report.80  The 
Commission argued that the 100-to-1 ratio could not be justified given 
the relative harm of crack use and the fact that the ratio primarily 
impacted minorities and lower-level defendants.81  The Commission 
 
 71. Id. at viii. 
 72. Id. at ix, xi (finding that only 15.1 percent of powder offenders possessed a dangerous 
weapon, while weapon possession for crack offenders was 27.9 percent). 
 73. Id. at xi. 
 74. Amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 60 Fed. Reg. 25076 
(proposed May 10, 1995). 
 75. Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Amendment, Disapproval, Pub. L. No. 104-38, 109 Stat. 
334 § 2(a)(1)(A) (1995). 
 76. See USSC 1997 REPORT, supra note 67, at 9. 
 77. Id. at 2. 
 78. See id.  In 1997, the Commission did not formally propose new regulations.  See, e.g., id. 
(“The Sentencing Commission thereby recommends that Congress revise the federal statutory 
penalty scheme for both crack and powder cocaine offenses . . . . After Congress has evaluated our 
recommendations and expressed its views, the Commission will amend the guidelines to reflect 
congressional intent.”); See USSC 2002 REPORT, supra note 67, at viii (recommending that 
Congress increase the mandatory minimum threshold quantities for crack offenses and then direct 
the Commission to modify the guidelines). 
 79. See USSC 2002 REPORT, supra note 67, at v. 
 80. See USSC 2002 REPORT, supra note 67. 
 81. Id. at v-viii. 
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proposed a 20-to-1 ratio,82 and once again Congress provided no 
response. 
IV. THE SUPREME COURT REDEFINES ITS SIXTH AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE 
The efficiency and uniformity associated with the Guidelines 
displaced the historical values of the right to a jury trial, due in large part 
to the imposition of longer sentences based on facts found by the judge 
rather than the jury.  The Court’s prior Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
recognized a criminal defendant’s right to demand that a jury find all 
factual elements necessary—beyond a reasonable doubt—for conviction 
of the crime charged.83  But the constitutional roles of judges and juries 
became muddled, and the Court began searching for ways to ensure 
judges retained discretion while also allowing the jury to function in the 
manner envisioned by the Framers of the Constitution.  In Apprendi v. 
New Jersey,84 the Court began its quest to clarify the constitutional roles 
of judges and juries in criminal sentencing. 
A.  Apprendi v. New Jersey 
In the early morning hours of December 22, 1994, Charles 
Apprendi, Jr., “fired several .22-caliber bullets into the home of an 
African-American family that had recently moved into” his 
neighborhood.85  During questioning by police, Apprendi admitted that 
he shot at the house because its occupants were “black in color” and, for 
that reason, he did not “want them in the neighborhood.”86  Under New 
Jersey’s hate crime statute, a judge was required to impose a sentence 
enhancement of “between 10 and 20 years” in prison for a crime 
committed with racial animus.87  Under the statute, this relevant conduct 
determination was a fact for the judge to find rather than the jury.88 
 
 82. Id. at viii. 
 83. See United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 
(1970). 
 84. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 85. Id. at 469. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 468-69.  More specifically, New Jersey’s “hate crime” statute requires an enhanced 
sentence when “[t]he defendant in committing the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an 
individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual 
orientation or ethnicity.”  Id. 
 88. Id. at 491. 
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Apprendi pleaded guilty to weapons possession charges, which 
carried a sentence of between 5 and 10 years in prison.89  As part of the 
plea bargain, the prosecution reserved the right to seek an enhanced 
sentence on the basis that the crime was committed with a biased 
purpose.90  Such an enhancement would have doubled the sentence 
otherwise imposed for each of the crimes.91  The trial judge accepted 
Apprendi’s plea and found by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Apprendi’s crime was motivated by the race of the victims.92  He 
sentenced Apprendi to 12 years in prison, 2 years above the maximum 
sentence authorized for the weapons charge apart from the race 
enhancement, and Apprendi appealed.93 
The Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed, 
finding the enhancement was a “sentencing factor” rather than an 
“element” of the underlying crime,94 and therefore not subject to the 
jury-trial and proof-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt requirements of the 
Constitution.  The New Jersey Supreme Court also affirmed and 
Apprendi filed a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme 
Court.95 
Prior to Apprendi, the Supreme Court had routinely declined to 
extend trial phase procedural protections to the post-trial sentencing 
hearing.96  Shifting the sentencing law landscape, the Apprendi Court 
stated, “jury protections extend, to some degree, ‘to determinations that 
[go] not to a defendant’s guilt or innocence, but simply to the length of 
his sentence.’”97  The Court, beginning its new era of sentencing 
jurisprudence, held, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact 
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
 
 89. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469-70. 
 90. Id. at 470.  Apprendi correspondingly reserved the right to challenge the hate crime 
sentence enhancement as violating the U.S. Constitution.   Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 471. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 471-72 (2000). 
 95. Id. at 474. 
 96. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997) (“[A] jury's verdict of acquittal 
does not prevent the sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the acquitted charge, so 
long as that conduct has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence.”); Witte v. United States, 
515 U.S. 389, 398 (1995) (“[T]he Due Process Clause did not require ‘that courts throughout the 
Nation abandon their age-old practice of seeking information from out-of-court sources to guide 
their judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence.’”); McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 
U.S. 79, 93 (1986) (noting that “there is no Sixth Amendment right to jury sentencing, even where 
the sentence turns on specific findings of fact”). 
 97. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 251 
(1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”98 
B. Blakely v. Washington 
Four years after Apprendi, the Court continued to redefine the fact-
finding roles of judges and juries in sentencing with Blakely v. 
Washington.99  Ralph Howard Blakely, Jr. married his wife Yolanda in 
1973.100  When his wife filed for divorce in 1998, Blakely kidnapped her 
from her home in Washington at knifepoint, forced her into a wooden 
box in the back of his pickup truck, and took her to Montana.101  He 
ordered their 13-year-old son to follow in another car, threatening to 
harm Yolanda with a shotgun if he did not comply.102  En route to 
Montana their son escaped, and Blakely and Yolanda stopped at a 
friend’s house.103  The friend called the police and Blakely was arrested 
in Montana.104 
Blakely was charged with first-degree kidnapping, but ultimately 
plead guilty to second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence 
and the use of a firearm.105  Under Washington law, second-degree 
kidnapping was a class B felony, punishable by a maximum sentence of 
10 years in prison.106  Washington’s mandatory sentencing guidelines 
required, however, that a judge impose a sentence of no less than 49 and 
no more than 53 months in prison, unless the judge had “substantial and 
compelling” reasons to impose a sentence outside that range.107  The trial 
judge sentenced Blakely to 90 months—37 months beyond the standard 
maximum—finding that Blakely had acted with “deliberate cruelty.”108  
Blakely appealed, arguing that the additional fact-finding by the judge 
violated the Court’s holding in Apprendi—that the jury must determine 
beyond a reasonable doubt all the facts legally necessary to support the 
sentence.109 
 
 98. Id. at 490. 
 99. 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 100. Id. at 298. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 298-99 (2004). 
 106. Id. at 299. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 300. 
 109. Id. at 301. 
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The Washington sentencing scheme compelled a judge to make 
relevant conduct determinations at sentencing, which then mechanically 
increased an offender’s sentence above that authorized by the jury.110  
Indeed, if the jury had found facts that increased Blakely’s determinate 
sentence, the case would have presented no constitutional violations.111  
The facts supporting a finding of “deliberate cruelty” in Blakely, 
however, had not been submitted to a jury, and Blakely had not admitted 
acting with “deliberate cruelty.”112  The State argued Apprendi was 
inapplicable because the Washington statutory maximum was 10 years, 
not 53 months.113  The Court disagreed and held that the “statutory 
maximum” punishment “is the maximum sentence a judge may impose 
solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by 
the defendant.”114  Because “deliberate cruelty” was not an element of 
the crimes to which Blakely pled guilty, the judge was prohibited from 
using that fact to enhance Blakely’s sentence above the 53-month 
statutory maximum.115  Continuing to redefine the jury’s role in 
sentencing, the Court stated the judge’s constitutional “authority to 
sentence derives wholly from the jury’s verdict,”116 and “[w]hen a judge 
inflicts punishment that the jury’s verdict alone does not allow,” that 
punishment is unconstitutional.117 
V. THE COURT TAKES ON THE GUIDELINES: BOOKER, KIMBROUGH AND 
GALL 
Apprendi and Blakely clarified the jury’s role in determining certain 
sentencing facts and limited judicial discretion in sentencing.  What 
effect those decisions would have on the Guidelines, however, was a 
question left unanswered.  Indeed, Justice Scalia stated in his Blakely 
opinion, “[t]he Federal Guidelines are not before us, and we express no 
opinion on them.”118  Enter United States v. Booker, 119 the case that 
would require Justice Scalia and his brethren to express such an opinion. 
 
 110. Id. at 298. 
 111. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 273 (2005) (Stevens, J. dissenting). 
 112. Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id.  See also Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 602 (2002) (stating “[a] defendant may not be 
‘expose[d] . . . to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the 
facts reflected in the jury verdict alone’”) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 483). 
 115. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 304. 
 116. Id. at 306. 
 117. Id. at 304. 
 118. Id. at 305 n.9 (noting the United States, as amicus curiae, questioned whether the 
differences between the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Washington’s statute were 
15
Cassidy: Examining Crack Cocaine Sentencing in a Post-Kimbrough World
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009
08-CASSIDY.DOC 1/29/2009  3:29:23 PM 
120 AKRON LAW REVIEW [42:105 
A. United States v. Booker 
In Booker, the deeply fractured Court produced a total of six 
opinions, with two dueling 5-4 majorities.120  Justice Stevens wrote what 
has been termed the “merits majority” opinion, answering the question 
of whether the application of the Guidelines violated the Sixth 
Amendment as articulated in Apprendi.121  The other majority opinion, 
viewed as the “remedial majority,” was written by Justice Breyer and 
addressed the question of how to remedy the Sixth Amendment violation 
identified by the Court.122 
In 2003, a jury found Booker guilty of possessing at least 50 grams 
of crack cocaine after hearing evidence that he had just over 90 grams in 
his duffel bag.123  The facts found by the jury called for a Guidelines 
sentence of 210-262 months.124  At sentencing, however, the judge found 
additional facts.125  By a preponderance of the evidence, the judge found 
Booker possessed 566 grams over and above the 92.5 grams found by 
the jury.126  Following the Sentencing Guidelines, the judge’s findings 
increased Booker’s base level offense from 32 to 36.127  The four-point 
difference increased Booker’s minimum sentence by 20 years; the 
change now called for a minimum sentence of 30 years and a maximum 
of life in prison.128  The district court judge sentenced Booker to the 
minimum, 30 years in prison.129 
The Sixth Amendment issue in Booker was all too similar to the 
issue present in both Apprendi and Blakely—all three cases excessively 
delegated determinate fact-finding decisions to the judge, rather than the 
jury.  The Booker Court sought to curtail the growing trend that “the 
judge, not the jury, . . . determined the upper limits of sentencing.”130  In 
its merits opinion, the Court referenced § 3553(b)(1), which provided 
that the sentencing court “shall impose a sentence of the kind and within 
 
constitutionally significant). 
 119. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 120. See Douglas A Berman, Conceptualizing Booker, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 387, 387 (2006). 
 121. David M. Zlotnick, The Future of Federal Sentencing Policy: Learning Lessons from 
Republican Judicial Appointees in the Guidelines Era, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2008). 
 122. Id. at 12. 
 123. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 235 (2005). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 509 (7th Cir. 2004). 
 128. Id. 
 129. Booker, 543 U.S. at 235. 
 130. Id. at 236. 
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the range” outlined in the Guidelines.131  This provision, the Court held, 
made “[t]he Guidelines, as written . . . mandatory and binding on all 
judges.”132  Unable to distinguish between the Guidelines and 
Washington’s sentencing scheme in Blakely,133 the Court held that the 
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.134 
To remedy the constitutional violation, the remedial opinion found 
§ 3553(b)(1) was “incompatible” with the merits opinion and therefore 
had to be “severed and excised” from the statute.135  The Court’s holding 
made the Guidelines “effectively advisory” so that the district courts 
could, after considering the Guidelines range, tailor a sentence that 
reflected the broader range of concerns set forth in § 3553(a).136 
Moreover, the Court held 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which addressed the 
handling of sentence appeals, must also be “severed and excised” 
because it was inextricably linked with the Guidelines’ mandatory 
sentencing provision.137  Before the Court’s decision in Booker, § 
3742(e) instructed appellate courts to determine whether a sentence was 
“unreasonable” with respect to the Guidelines range.138  After Booker, 
the Court read the remaining provisions of the sentencing appeal statute 
to instruct appellate courts to determine whether sentences were 
“unreasonable” with respect to all the factors set forth in § 3553(a).139 
The Court’s holding in Booker created a sentencing muddle.140  The 
merits opinion, which invalidated the Guidelines, continued to build on 
the Court’s new Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  The remedial opinion, 
however, reintroduced the role of judicial fact-finding at sentencing.141  
In the words of one sentencing scholar, “Booker declared that the federal 
sentencing system could no longer rely upon mandated and tightly 
directed judicial fact-finding, but as a remedy it created a system which 
now depends upon discretionary and loosely directed judicial fact-
 
 131. Id. at 234. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 235 (stating that “[t]here is no relevant distinction between the sentence imposed 
pursuant to the Washington statutes in Blakely and the sentences imposed pursuant to the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines in these cases”). 
 134. Id. at 244. 
 135. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005). 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 261. 
 139. Id. at 260-65. 
 140. See Berman, supra note 120, at 387.  “Read independently, each majority opinion in 
Booker seems conceptually muddled; read together, the two Booker rulings seem almost 
conceptually nonsensical.”  Id. 
 141. Id. at 407. 
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finding.”142  Booker created a host of problems for crack cocaine cases in 
particular, where courts struggled with the disparate crack/powder 
sentencing scheme juxtaposed with the “effectively advisory”143 
Guidelines.  A number of district court judges had assailed the 
crack/powder disparity and sentenced offenders under a different ratio—
i.e., 10-to-1 or 20-to-1—rationalizing that, after Booker, sentencing 
judges could impose a sentence outside the advisory Guidelines range.144  
The appellate courts ran roughshod over these district court decisions, 
and often held that a departure from the 100-to-1 ratio was “per se 
unreasonable.”145 
In the 2006-2007 term, the Court began to clarify “reasonableness.”  
In Rita v. United States, the Court was asked to determine whether a 
sentence within the Guidelines range may be presumed reasonable.146  
Rita was decided by an 8-1 vote, and held that courts of appeals may—
but are not required to—apply a presumption that a sentence within the 
Guidelines range is reasonable, although such a presumption is not 
binding.147  After Rita, appellate courts are to treat a judge’s choice of 
sentence within the range with deference.148  But Rita only began to 
clarify reasonableness, and many questions remained unanswered.  
Moreover, district court judges were still grappling with Booker and its 
application to the 100-to-1 ratio.149  In 2007, the Court took on two cases 
addressing these issues.  In Kimbrough v. United States, the issue was 
whether a sentence outside the Guidelines range was unreasonable when 
it was based on a policy disagreement with the crack/powder sentencing 
disparity.150  In the second case, Gall v. United States,151 the Court was 
asked whether a below-Guidelines sentence was unlawful absent 
“extraordinary circumstances.” 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See infra notes 205-206 and accompanying text. 
 145. See infra notes 210-212 and accompanying text. 
 146. 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007). 
 147. Id. at 2462-63. 
 148. Id. at 2463. 
 149. See infra notes 205-206 and accompanying text. 
 150. 174 F. App’x 798 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June 11, 2007) 
(No. 06-6330). 
 151. 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June 11, 2007) (No. 06-
7949).  Initially, the Court granted certiorari in a different case involving a below Guidelines range 
sentence, Claiborne v. U.S.  Petitioner Mario Claiborne, however, died before the Court could 
answer the question in his case.  Claiborne’s case was removed from the docket and replaced with 
Gall.  439 F.3d 479 (8th Cir. 2006), vacated as moot, 127 S. Ct. 2245 (2007). 
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B. Kimbrough v. United States 
In September of 2004, Derrick Kimbrough was indicted and 
charged with various drug crimes and possession of a firearm while 
engaging in a drug trafficking offense.152  Kimbrough pleaded guilty to 
the crimes charged and admitted he was responsible for 56 grams of 
crack-cocaine and 92.1 grams of powder cocaine.153  Kimbrough’s drug 
charges called for a base offense level of 32.154  The district court found 
Kimbrough testified falsely at his codefendant’s trial and increased his 
offense level to 34.155  Based on his pre-sentence report, Kimbrough had 
a criminal history category of II.156  The Guidelines specified a range of 
168 to 210 months for an offense level of 34 and a criminal history of II, 
and the possession of a firearm charge added a statutory minimum of 60 
months.157  All things considered, Kimbrough faced an advisory 
Guidelines range of 228 to 270 months, or 19 to 22.5 years.158 
The district court judge found that a sentence of 19 to 22.5 years 
was “greater than necessary” to satisfy the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a), and further noted that Kimbrough’s case highlighted the 
“disproportionate and unjust effect that crack cocaine guidelines have in 
sentencing.”159  In justifying the reduction from the Guidelines range of 
228 to 270 months, the court reasoned that if Kimbrough had been 
charged with an equivalent amount of powder cocaine, his sentencing 
range, including the 5-year mandatory minimum firearm charge, would 
have been 97 to 106 months.160  Finding the statutory minimum sentence 
was “clearly long enough,” the district court sentenced Kimbrough to 
180 months in prison and 5 years supervised release.161  The U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, 
vacated the sentence.162  Citing an earlier and controlling opinion, the 
Fourth Circuit stated a sentence “outside the Guideline range is per se 
 
 152. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 564 (2007). 
 153. Id. at 564-65. 
 154. Id. at 565. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 565 (2007). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id.  Kimbrough was sentenced to 120 months on each of the three drug counts, to be 
served concurrently, and an additional 60 months on the firearm charge, to be served consecutively.  
Id. at 565 n.3. 
 162. Id. at 565. 
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unreasonable” if based on a disagreement with the 100-to-1 sentencing 
scheme.163 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether its 
holding in Booker rendered “advisory” the crack/powder disparity 
adopted by the Guidelines.164  Kimbrough was decided by a vote of 7-2, 
and Justice Ginsburg began the opinion by examining the disparate 
treatment of crack and powder cocaine under federal sentencing laws, 
and the modifications made to § 3553 after Booker.165  The Court stated, 
“while [§ 3553(a)] still requires a court to give respectful consideration 
to the Guidelines, Booker ‘permits the court to tailor the sentence in light 
of other statutory concerns as well.’”166  The Government argued that the 
100-to-1 ratio was an exception to the “general freedom that sentencing 
courts have to apply the [§ 3553(a)] factors . . . because the ratio is a 
‘specific policy determinatio[n] that Congress has directed sentencing 
courts to observe.’”167 
The Government supported its position by arguing that the presence 
of the 100-to-1 ratio in the 1986 Act prohibits the Commission and the 
sentencing courts from applying anything other than the ratio.168  The 
Court disagreed, and cited the language in the Act, which, in the Court’s 
opinion, provided only minimum and maximum sentences.169  
Distribution of 5 grams or more of crack required a minimum sentence 
of 5 years and a maximum sentence of 40 years.170  Possession of 50 
grams or more called for a minimum sentence of 10 years and a 
maximum of life in prison.171  The statute, the Court stated, “says 
nothing about the appropriate sentences within these brackets, and we 
decline to read any implicit directive into that congressional silence.”172 
The Government also argued that Congress’ rejection of the 
Commission’s 1-to-1 ratio proposed in 1995 as an amendment to the 
Guidelines was proof Congress intended the Commission and sentencing 
 
 163. Id. 
 164. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 565-66. 
 165. Id. at 566-70 (discussing how each drug is made, a brief history of the mandatory 
minimum scheme, the Sentencing Commission’s reports to Congress, and its 2007 crack 
amendment). 
 166. Id. at 570. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 571. 
 170. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 571 (2007). 
 171. Id. 
 172. Id. 
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courts to apply the 100-to-1 ratio.173  The Court recognized Congress’ 
dismissal of the Commission’s 1995 proposal, but also noted that it was 
Congress who requested the Commission recommend a “revision of the 
drug quantity ratio of crack cocaine to powder cocaine.”174  Moreover, 
the Court found nothing in Congress’ reaction to the Commission’s 1995 
report that crack sentences—outside the minimum and maximum 
sentences—must exceed powder sentences by a 100-to-1 ratio.175 
The Kimbrough Court also referenced the Commission’s 2007 
crack amendment176 that created a crack/powder ratio varying between 
25-to-1 and 80-to-1, depending upon the offense level.177  Congress, the 
Court stated, took no action regarding the 2007 “proposed amendment to 
the Guidelines in a high-profile area in which it had previously exercised 
its disapproval authority under 28 U.S.C. § 994(p).”178  Relying on the 
Commission’s findings that the crack/powder disparity produces 
disproportionately harsh sentences, the Court held “it would not be an 
abuse of discretion for a district court to conclude when sentencing a 
particular defendant that the crack/powder disparity yields a sentence 
 
 173. Id. at 572. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE CRACK 
COCAINE AMENDMENT IF MADE RETROACTIVE (2007), http://www.ussc.gov/general/Impact_ 
Analysis_20071003_3b.pdf (hereinafter USSC 2007 ANALYSIS).  On May 1, 2007, the Commission 
notified Congress it was lowering the Guidelines sentencing ranges for certain crack offenses and 
offenders.  Absent congressional action the Commission announced the amendment would become 
effective November 1, 2007.  Id. at 1.  The six-month review period yielded no congressional action 
and the Commission’s amendment to the Guidelines for crack cocaine offenses went into effect.  On 
December 11, 2007, the Commission voted unanimously to apply the amendment retroactively, with 
an effective date of March 3, 2008.  UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, “READER-
FRIENDLY” VERSION OF AMENDMENTS ON RETROACTIVITY EFFECTIVE MARCH 3, 2008 (2008), 
http://www.ussc.gov/2007guid/030308rf.pdf.  The Commission’s amendment, however, does not 
affect the mandatory minimums set by the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986.  Other offenders are also 
excluded.  Crack cocaine offenders with a base offense level less than 12 or equal to 43 and those 
who possessed a crack cocaine quantity greater than 4,500 grams are ineligible to receive a reduced 
sentence.  USSC 2007 ANALYSIS at 5-6.  In addition, offenders sentenced under the career offender 
guideline, § 4B1.1, or the armed career offender guideline, § 4B1.4, are not eligible to receive 
reduced sentences.  Id. at 6.  As a result of the Commission’s amendment, a memorandum prepared 
in 2007 by the Commission’s Office of Research and Data (ORD) estimated 19,500 crack cocaine 
offenders sentenced between October 1, 1991 and June 30, 2007 would be eligible to file a motion 
for a reduced sentence.  Id. at 4-5.  According to ORD, the average estimated sentence reduction 
would be 27 months, with 63.5% of offenders receiving a reduction of 2 years or less, 28.6% 
receiving a reduction of one year or less, and 7.9% eligible for a reduction of 49 months or more.  
Id. at 23. 
 177. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 573 (2007). 
 178. Id. 
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‘greater than necessary’ to achieve § 3553(a)’s purpose, even in a mine-
run case.”179 
C. Gall v. United States 
Brian Gall was part of a ring that distributed the illegal drug known 
as “ecstasy.”180  Months after joining the enterprise, Gall informed his 
co-conspirators he was leaving the business.181  He graduated from 
college and moved to Arizona where he obtained a construction job.182  
While working in Arizona, Gall was approached by federal agents and 
questioned about his role in the ecstasy ring.183  He admitted 
involvement, and the federal agents initially took no action.184  A year 
and a half after the agents’ visit in Arizona, and three and a half years 
after Gall withdrew from the drug ring, he was charged with conspiracy 
to distribute ecstasy, cocaine and marijuana.185 
Gall pled guilty to the conspiracy charge, stipulating that he was 
“responsible for, but did not necessarily distribute himself, at least 2,500 
grams of [ecstasy], or the equivalent of at least 87.5 kilograms of 
marijuana.”186  The Guidelines range for his crime was 30 to 37 months 
of imprisonment.187  Gall was sentenced to 36 months’ probation—a 
sentence well below the Guidelines range.188  After considering the 
factors outlined in § 3553(a), the district court judge found the “sentence 
imposed . . . was sufficient, but not greater than necessary to serve the 
purposes of sentencing.”189  The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
 179. Id. at 575. 
 180. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591-92 (2007). 
 181. Id. at 592. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 592 (2007). 
 187. Id. at 593. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id.  Probation, according to the district judge, was sufficient because: 
Any term of imprisonment in this case would be counter effective by depriving society 
of the contributions of the Defendant who, the Court has found, understands the 
consequences of his criminal conduct and is doing everything in his power to forge a 
new life.  The Defendant’s post-offense conduct indicates neither that he will return to 
criminal behavior nor that the Defendant is a danger to society.  In fact, the Defendant's 
post-offense conduct was not motivated by a desire to please the Court or any other 
governmental agency, but was the pre-Indictment product of the Defendant's own desire 
to lead a better life. 
Id. 
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overturned Gall’s sentence, concluding that the sentence outside the 
Guidelines range amounted to “an extraordinary reduction [that] must be 
supported by extraordinary circumstances.”190  The court found the 
reduction to probation “unreasonable,”191 and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari.192 
Gall, like Kimbrough, was decided by a 7-2 vote.193  Justice 
Stevens delivered the majority opinion and began his analysis by 
reiterating that Booker rendered the Guidelines advisory and limited 
appellate review to determining reasonableness.194  When imposing a 
sentence outside the Guidelines range, the district court must explain the 
reasoning behind the unusually lenient or harsh sentence and provide 
sufficient justification.195  An appellate court may assess the departure 
from the Guidelines, but may not require “extraordinary circumstances” 
or employ a rigid mathematical formula to determine whether the district 
court’s justification was appropriate.196  Both approaches, the Court 
held, could create an impermissible unreasonableness presumption for 
sentences outside the Guidelines range and reflect a heightened standard 
of review, which is inconsistent with the rule that appellate courts are to 
apply an abuse-of-discretion standard to all sentencing decisions.197 
The Court held that under the abuse-of-discretion standard, the 
appellate court must first review the sentence imposed by the district 
court for procedural errors, and then consider the sentence’s substantive 
reasonableness.198  The appellate court must consider the totality of the 
circumstances—including the extent of the variance—and the district 
court should be given deference in its decision that sufficient factors 
exist under § 3553(a) to warrant the variance.199  The Court further 
stated that an appellate court may not reverse simply because it might 
reasonably reach a different conclusion.200 
The Gall Court concluded that the Eighth Circuit’s de novo review 
was improper because it failed to give deference to the district court’s 
 
 190. United States v. Gall, 446 F.3d 884, 889 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 191. Id. 
 192. 446 F.3d 884 (8th Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 2933 (U.S. June 11, 2007) (No. 06-
7949). 
 193. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007). 
 194. Id. at 594. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at 594-95. 
 197. Id. at 595-96. 
 198. Id. at 597. 
 199. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). 
 200. Id. 
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“reasoned and reasonable” sentencing decision.201  Because the district 
court in Gall committed no procedural error, the Eighth Circuit’s review 
was limited to the reasonableness of the sentence, “i.e., whether the 
District Judge abused his discretion in determining that the § 3553(a) 
factors supported a sentence of probation and justified a substantial 
deviation from the Guidelines range.”202 
VI.  KIMBROUGH: THE AFTERMATH 
The Kimbrough decision has largely been viewed as a positive step 
in addressing the disparity caused by the current crack/powder 
sentencing scheme.203  While judges must still adhere to the statutory 
mandatory minimums set forth in the Act, Kimbrough authorizes judges 
to impose sentences outside the Guidelines range based on policy 
disagreements with the 100-to-1 ratio.204  But if the Kimbrough decision 
was the Court’s way of remedying disparate sentencing in crack and 
powder cases, its decision may have missed its mark. 
A. Crack Cocaine Sentencing Post-Booker 
Pre-Kimbrough, several district courts relied on Booker when 
deviating from the Guidelines range in crack cases.  The rationale was 
that advisory Guidelines meant district court judges could impose a 
sentence outside the Guidelines range if they disagreed with the higher 
penalties associated with crack cocaine.  Some courts adopted a 10-to-1 
ratio,205 while others chose a 20-to-1 ratio.206  At least one court has 
chosen to maintain the 100-to-1 ratio initially set forth in the Act and 
 
 201. Id. at 602. 
 202. Id. at 600. 
 203. See, e.g., Mark Allenbaugh, A Positive Development in All the Sentencing Insanity:  How 
The Supreme Court and the U.S. Sentencing Commission Have Begun to Correct the Damage Done 
by the War on Drugs, FINDLAW, Dec. 19, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/allenbaugh 
/20071219.html (stating Kimbrough and Gall “rightly place [the] power back in the hands of the 
district court judges most familiar with the facts of the offense and the offender upon whom they are 
imposing a sentence”); Ellis Cose, The Harm of ‘Get Tough’ Policies:  The Supreme Court’s rulings 
on federal cocaine sentences could be a turning point—toward justice and righting an old wrong, 
NEWSWEEK, Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.newsweek.com/ id/77820 (quoting Marc Mauer of the 
Sentencing Project speaking about the Commission’s 2007 crack amendment and Kimbrough:  “In 
this business, you don’t get too many good days . . . . Now, two in a row”). 
 204. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 (2007). 
 205. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 451 F. Supp. 2d 553, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
 206. See, e.g., United States v. Stukes, No. 03 CR. 601, 2005 WL 2560244, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 
Oct. 12, 2005); United States v. Leroy, 373 F. Supp. 2d 887, 893 (E.D. Wis. 2005); United States v. 
Castillo, No. 03 CR. 835, 2005 WL 1214280, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2005). 
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included in the Commission’s first set of Guidelines.207  One judge in the 
Southern District of New York stated, “there is no rational basis in terms 
of pharmacological differences, public opinion, or related violence to 
distinguish crack cocaine from powder cocaine at a ratio of one being 
one hundred times worse than the other.”208  Another judge in the 
Eastern District of California took an opposing view: “I don’t believe 
it’s appropriate for the Court to specifically reduce a sentence under 18 
U.S.C. 3553(a) on the basis that the Congress and the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission are wrong in establishing different penalties for different 
types of controlled substances . . . To the extent the difference in 
penalties are out of whack, it’s for the Congress to change them, not this 
trial court.”209  District court judges saw Booker as an opportunity to 
choose the ratio they deemed appropriate; the appellate courts, however, 
read Booker differently. 
After Booker, district court decisions deviating from the 100-to-1 
ratio were frequently overturned by the appellate courts.  In United 
States v. Pho, the First Circuit rejected the district court’s adoption of a 
20-to-1 crack/powder ratio and characterized the lower court’s decision 
as a “policy judgment, pure and simple,” which “usurped Congress’s 
judgment about the proper sentencing policy for cocaine offenders.”210  
The Fourth Circuit in United States v. Eura came to a similar conclusion 
when it rejected a district court’s 20-to-1 ratio.211  The appellate court 
stated, “[a]s much as one might sympathize with the district court’s 
concern regarding the inequities of the 100:1 ratio . . . it simply would 
go against two explicit Congressional directives to allow sentencing 
courts to treat crack cocaine dealers on the same, or some different 
judicially-imposed, plane as powder cocaine dealers.”212  The appellate 
courts, while stifling any discretion the sentencing judges thought they 
had concerning the crack/powder disparity, used their review power to 
limit disparity and maintain the ratio set forth by Congress.  Because of 
the way in which the courts of appeals routinely overturned the district 
courts’ decisions, Booker did little to remedy the harms caused by the 
crack cocaine sentencing scheme. 
 
 207. United States v. Medina-Casteneda, 511 F.3d 1246, 1248-49 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 208. Fisher, 451 F. Supp. 2d at 559. 
 209. Medina-Casteneda, 511 F.3d at 1248-49. 
 210. 433 F.3d 53, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 211. 440 F.3d 625, 633 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 212. Id. 
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B. Kimbrough’s and Gall’s Effect on Crack Cocaine Sentencing 
The Supreme Court in Kimbrough explicitly authorized the district 
courts to consider the crack/powder disparity when sentencing an 
offender.213  After Gall, appellate courts may only review the sentence 
for reasonableness, “i.e., whether the District Judge abused his discretion 
in determining that the § 3553(a) factors supported [the sentence 
imposed] and justified a substantial deviation from the Guidelines 
range.”214  Absent a finding of abuse of discretion, appellate courts must 
now yield to the district courts’ judgments.215  Under this new system, 
the potential for excessive disparity in crack cocaine sentencing may be 
greater than ever. 
Judges—even those within the same courthouse—are likely to 
differ in opinion as to what crack/powder ratio is proper when 
sentencing an offender.  Indeed, the Kimbrough Court stated “some 
departures from uniformity [are] a necessary cost of the remedy we 
[have] adopted.”216  The Court continued, “district courts must take 
account of sentencing practices in other courts” and the “disparities must 
be weighed against the other § 3553(a) factors.”217  Following this 
reasoning, does the Court expect district court judges to know what 
ratios all other district courts are applying?  Assuming these judges had 
this information, are they then expected to impose the Guidelines ratio 
even if they find a departure is warranted, simply to avoid disparity 
among the courts?  It is not hard to imagine this practice resulting in 
deviations in crack sentencing in cases decided soon after Kimbrough—
before the level of disparity is realized—and judges deciding cases years 
from now following the Guidelines more closely, in an effort to remedy 
what will have become a disparate system.  If that is the case, the 
discretion afforded to judges post-Kimbrough becomes moot. 
It seems unlikely that judges from different districts will give 
deference to the ratios being applied in other districts when considering 
the § 3553(a) factors in a case before them.  The more logical outcome is 
that judges will begin to pursue their own policy agendas.  This will 
undoubtedly result in offenders with identical records who are charged 
 
 213. Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 575 (2007). 
 214. Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 600 (2007). 
 215. See id. at 597 (“[T]he appellate court . . . must give due deference to the district court's 
decision that the §3553(a) factors, on a whole, justify the extent of the variance.  The fact that the 
appellate court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is 
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.”). 
 216. Kimbrough, 128 S. Ct. at 574. 
 217. Id. 
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with identical crimes receiving vastly different sentences simply because 
of the ideological views of the judges hearing their cases.  Judges in 
favor of “get tough” drug policies will be reluctant to apply a downward 
departure at sentencing, while those that believe the nation’s drug laws 
are in need of reform will take full advantage of the Court’s Kimbrough 
holding.  A system in which some judges impose harsh penalties and 
others impose lax sentences for the same crimes is anathema to § 
3553(a)(6), which instructs sentencing courts “to avoid unwarranted 
sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have 
been found guilty of similar conduct.”218 
While it is too early to tell exactly how judges will apply 
Kimbrough, disparate sentencing is more likely to occur post-Kimbrough 
and Gall, as opposed to post-Booker.  The post-Booker appellate check, 
which prevented substantial disparity, is no longer in play post-
Kimbrough.  Cases decided in the wake of Kimbrough and Gall illustrate 
the now-limited role appellate courts have when reviewing a district 
court’s sentence.  After Kimbrough, Pho was abrogated219 and Eura was 
vacated and remanded, with the Fourth Circuit ultimately affirming per 
curiam the district court’s original reduced sentence.220  The Third, 
Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have also vacated sentences and 
remanded cases in which they initially held district courts could not 
consider the crack/powder disparity at sentencing.221  While some of the 
circuits have been careful to note that Kimbrough does not require 
judges to consider the crack/powder disparity in all cocaine cases,222 
Gall has severely limited the appellate courts’ authority to overturn 
sentences by judges who do. 
 
 218. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006). 
 219. See Kimbrough,128 S. Ct. at 558. 
 220. United States v. Eura, 268 F. App’x. 245, 249 (4th Cir. 2008). 
 221. See e.g., United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 223 (3rd Cir. 2008); United States v. 
Roberson, 517 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that pre-Kimbrough “neither Booker nor § 
3553(a) authorizes district courts to reject the 100:1 ratio,” but post-Kimbrough, the district may 
consider the disparity caused by the ratio); United States v. Medina-Casteneda, 511 F.3d 1246, 1249 
(9th Cir. 2008) (stating on remand that the district court is to consider “whether the disparity 
between crack and powder cocaine produced a sentence ‘greater than necessary’ under § 3553(a)”); 
United States v. Stratton, 519 F.3d 1305, 1306 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that prior precedent held 
federal courts were “not at liberty to supplant [Congress’s] policy decision” concerning the 
crack/powder disparity, but recognizing that Kimbrough overruled such precedent”). 
 222. See, e.g., Roberson, 517 F.3d at 995 (noting  “[w]e do not believe . . . Kimbrough means 
that a district court now acts unreasonably, abuses its discretion, or otherwise commits error if it 
does not consider the crack/powder sentencing disparity”); Stratton, 519 F.3d at 1307 (holding 
“[w]e do not suggest . . . that the district court must impose any particular sentence or that the 
district court is not free to impose the same sentence after considering the § 3553(a) factors”). 
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The question then becomes, was the Court’s Kimbrough decision a 
positive development in addressing the crack/powder disparity?  The 
answer depends on one’s view of the disparity.  The system that imposes 
higher penalties on crack offenders has received an enormous amount of 
criticism.  Even those judges who continued to apply the 100-to-1 ratio 
post-Booker often criticized it before concluding it was an issue only 
Congress could remedy.223  The Commission’s recent crack amendment 
changing the ratio to one that varies between 25-to-1 and 80-to-1,224 
depending on the offense level, and the Court’s holding in Kimbrough 
should reduce the disparity caused by 100-to-1 ratio.  Neither the 
Commission’s amendment nor the Court’s holding in Kimbrough, 
however, can reduce a new disparity Kimbrough actually creates; that is, 
the disparity resulting from individual judges’ policy disagreements with 
the crack/powder disparity, which will ultimately result in similarly 
situated offenders receiving different sentences.  Thus, Kimbrough and 
Gall may eventually lead to a sentencing system whereby disparity is 
reduced between crack offenders and powder offenders, but it may also 
foster a system that increases disparity among individual crack 
offenders. 
C. Congress: It’s Time 
Congress can solve the crack/powder disparity just as easily as it 
created it—by removing mandatory minimum provisions and providing 
a ratio that promotes fair and uniform sentencing.  But Congress has 
been reluctant to act, even though the Commission, and in recent years 
the Supreme Court, have been nudging and prodding.  Will Kimbrough, 
and the sentencing muddle it may create, be the straw that breaks 
Congress’ back?  If Congress has any interest in curtailing the 
sentencing disparity arising from increased judicial discretion, now is an 
opportune time to act.  If, however, Congress wishes to avoid interfering 
in the inevitable power struggle between the courts, there are other 
reasons to address the crack/powder sentencing scheme. 
Since the Act was passed in 1986, the crack market has changed 
drastically.  Crack is no longer in high demand.225  The decline in street 
markets, coupled with aggressive policing, has reduced crack-related 
violence and youth recruitment.226  Additionally, over two decades later, 
 
 223. See supra note 211 and accompanying text. 
 224. See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
 225. Blumstein, supra note 23, at 89. 
 226. Id. 
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social scientists have studied the effects of mandatory minimums and the 
crack/powder disparity and have concluded that both have contributed to 
racial discrimination227 and overcrowding in prisons.228  Moreover, 
studies show harsh drug penalties fall well short of deterring crime and 
are largely counterproductive.229 
Of course, these studies have been around for more than a decade, 
and the Commission presented much of this information to Congress 
when it issued its 1995, 1997, and 2002 reports.230  In the past, much of 
this information was ignored by Congress, but there are reasons to 
believe Congress may now be listening.  During the 2007-2008 
legislative session, six crack cocaine reform bills were introduced.231  
And while most of the proposed legislation appears to be at a standstill, 
crime policy is often politically driven and 2008 was a presidential 
election year.  Perhaps a better indicator of Congress’ willingness to 
change is its handling of the dramatic rise of methamphetamine, which 
 
 227. Id. (“The 100:1 disparity is widely seen as a blatant demonstration of racial discrimination 
by the criminal justice system . . . . Similar concerns surround racial profiling in police stops and 
racial disproportionality in prison, but in neither of these kinds of situations is the disparity so 
explicitly built into the law.”). 
 228. See Marc Mauer and Ryan S. King, A 25-Year Quagmire:  The War on Drugs and Its 
Impact on American Society, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, September 2007, at 2, 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/Admin/Documents/ publications/dp_25yearquagmire.pdf (finding 
“[d]rug offenders in prisons and jails have increased 1100% since 1980”). 
 229. See, e.g., id. at 17 (stating that “there is some evidence that simply warehousing 
individuals in prison may have a criminogenic effect, as research has found higher rates of 
recidivism for persons sentenced to prison rather than probation” and suggesting treatment is more 
cost effective); See also PEW Center on the States, The Impact of Incarceration on Crime:  Two 
National Experts Weigh In, PEW PUBLIC SAFETY PERFORMANCE PROJECT, Apr. 2008, at 1, 
available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org/uploadedFiles/Crime%20Incarceration%20QA 
.pdf (finding incapacitating drug dealers has little effect on reducing drug dealing in society because 
“the [drug] market is resilient in responding to the demand, and recruits replacements for those sent 
to prison”). 
 230. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
 231. Fairness in Cocaine Sentencing Act of 2008, H.R. 5035, 110th Cong. (2008) (eliminating 
the distinction between crack and powder cocaine and removing mandatory minimum provisions); 
Drug Sentencing Reform and Cocaine Kingpin Trafficking Act of 2007, S. 1711, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (reducing the crack/powder disparity by imposing a single mandatory minimum at the 
current powder cocaine levels); Fairness in Drug Sentencing Act of 2007, S. 1685, 110th Cong. 
(2007) (raising the 5 year mandatory minimum threshold from 5 to 25 grams of crack and the 10 
year threshold from 50 to 250 grams of crack, which reduces the disparity from 100:1 to 20:1); 
Drug Sentencing Reform Act of 2007, S. 1383, 110th Cong. (2007) (lowering the 10 year threshold 
for powder from 5 kilos to 4 kilos while increasing the threshold for crack from 50 grams to 200 
grams, resulting in a disparity of 4 kilos powder to 200 grams crack); Powder-Crack Cocaine 
Penalty Equalization Act of 2007, H.R. 79, 110th Cong. (2007) (raising the powder levels to meet 
the crack levels); Crack-Cocaine Equitable Sentencing Act of 2007, H.R. 460, 110th Cong. (2007) 
(equalizing the crack and powder penalties at the powder level). 
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some have termed the “new crack.”232  In 2006, Congress enacted the 
first comprehensive methamphetamine law, which, surprisingly, focuses 
less on tougher penalties and more on cutting off access to the 
ingredients used to manufacture the drug.233  In a separate bill that never 
became law, the House Judiciary Committee, by a vote of 31-0, removed 
the mandatory minimum penalties for methamphetamine included in an 
earlier version of the legislation.234  Finally, when the Commission 
notified Congress it was lowering the Guidelines sentencing ranges for 
certain crack offenses and offenders, it gave Congress six months to 
comment on the proposed amendment.235  The six-month review period 
yielded no congressional action, and the amendment was adopted and 
later made retroactive.236  Congress’ silence on this matter may be telling 
since the amendment specifically addressed the crack/powder 
disparity.237 
Congressional action, however, not silence, is the only way to 
redress the problems caused by the crack/powder sentencing scheme.  
The time to act is now, Congress.  We are waiting. 
 
 232. Press Release, U.S. Senate, Schumer: New Stats Show Crystal Meth Quickly Becoming 
the New Crack—Seizures in New York Up 31% Over Last Year, (April 25, 2004), 
http://www.senate.gov/~schumer/SchumerWebsite/pressroom/press_releases/2004/PR02593.Crystal
methsunpres042504.html (“Crystal meth is becoming the new crack, and we need tough new 
penalties that treat it like crack.”). 
 233. Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 
(2006). 
 234. Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Mandatory minimums stripped from federal 
meth bill, H.R. 3889 (Nov. 10, 2005), http://www.famm.org/ExploreSentencing/Federal 
Sentencing/BillsinCongress/Mandatoryminimumsstrippedfromfederalmethbill.aspx. 
 235. See supra note 176. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See supra note 75 and accompanying text (noting in 1995 Congress explicitly disapproved 
the Commission’s amendment to reduce the 100-to-1 ratio). 
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